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Introduction 
 
For a few years, public hospitals in France and in most of developed countries have 
had to deal with major issues. New legislations have recently been introduced, such as a 
prospective payment system (PPS: hospitals are reimbursed depending of the amount of 
services they provide), which aims at developing “business-like” management models, 
according to the New Public Management principles (Osborne & Gaebler 1994). Therefore, 
the dominant institutional logic in healthcare organizations is shifting, sometimes in very 
short periods of time, from “medical professionalism” to “business-like healthcare” (Reay & 
Hinings 2005). The PPS is a pro-competitive trigger, since hospitals are encouraged to 
develop their activity in order to generate more income by gaining market shares (Moisdon 
2013).  
What is more, public hospitals often have to cope with a major problem of medical 
workforce shortages (Kroezen et al. 2015), which threatens the existence of some activities in 
a lot of institutions, particularly in remote areas. 
Furthermore, the evolution of medical practices, for instance the ambulatory turning 
point which consists in reducing, when possible, patient stay in hospitals to less than 24 hours, 
brings about a series of organizational concerns, as hospitals will be asked to cooperate with 
different stakeholders about healthcare pathways. 
All in all, as in many developed countries, hospitals are pressurized into providing 
better care at an affordable cost, in a dynamic and uncertain environment, with potentially 
clashing demands. 
 
In order to generate a transformation of the French public hospitals territory 
organization, and so as to meet the challenges mentioned above, the French government has 
implemented a set of tools aiming at fostering restructuration between neighbouring hospitals, 
thanks to cooperation and merger processes. For instance, a law voted in 2009 provided 
hospitals with the possibility to cooperate in Territory Hospital Communities. 
Private clinics have been dramatically restructured in the past two decades amongst 
integrated networks, but public hospitals, which have been used to working relatively 
autonomously, have not followed this process to the same extent in France (Delas 2011). The 
results that the government was calling for have not been rather mixed so far. Given this 
relative failure, the State has decided to step up a gear by making cooperation mandatory. By 
the end of 2016, all hospitals will have to be part of a Territory Hospital Group. Territory 
organization of healthcare providers is regulated by Regional Health Agencies (RHA), whose 
mission is to promote restructuration leading to a better access to healthcare at an affordable 
cost. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the management literature about 
organizational change implementation in the case of inter-hospital reorganization, by 
analysing restructuring processes under way in France. The empirical material collected will 
be used to answer the following research questions: 
1. To what extent are inter-hospital restructuring strategies an answer to uncertainty (such as 
the lack of medical resources) and pro-competitive triggers (e.g. the PPS) they have to cope 
with? 
2. Is the transformation of the French public hospitals territory organisation led thanks to a 
regulated restructuration process, or is it the result of “making do” bottom-up strategies 
(sometimes partially unsuccessful) between hospitals? 
 
The study was carried out thanks to two different case studies that analysed inter-
organizational restructuration strategies in two French public hospital groups. Qualitative data 
was collected mainly by carrying out 30 semi-structured interviews with different 
stakeholders involved in the processes. 
This paper shows that even though the necessity of performing inter-hospital 
restructuration in globally accepted by the different stakeholders, the conditions to implement 
this process raise a number of concerns. The role and missions of the regulatory institutions is 
not always clearly defined. Moreover, because of multiple factors that will be presented, it 
may be observed that inter-hospital restructuration is more often the result of “making do” 
bottom-up strategies, with uneven results, rather than that of a rational and wider regulation. 
 
Literature review 
 
Organizational change in Healthcare systems has been the focus of many research 
articles in the past few years. Several scientific authors account for the strong systemic inertia 
by pointing out professional group logics, which often are obstacles to the implementation of 
organizational change in healthcare, characterized by shifts in dominant institutional logics 
imposed by new legislations. For instance Reay & Hinings (2005) analyse the restructuration 
of the Health Care field in Alberta Canada, after a reform that promoted “business-like” 
management models at the expense of the “medical professionalism” logic that used to be 
dominant. Battilana & Casciaro (2012) explain the conditions that foster the adoption of 
change based on the examples of the transfer of clinical tasks from physicians to nurses and of 
policies challenging the dominance of hospitals over different healthcare providers, in the 
British National Health Service. 
 
Inter-hospital restructuration (from cooperation to more radical change such as 
mergers) has been analysed in European countries, with divergent conclusion about their 
impact on reducing expenditure (Kristensen 2012, Bengt 2008). In France, the failure of 
public hospitals mergers in the 1990s encouraged the government to promote cooperation, as 
a softer restructuring process that is more easily accepted by stakeholders (Louazel 2013). 
However, corporatization of public healthcare providers observed in the past two decades 
(Ellwood 1996) which was implemented in order to foster performance, also produced 
undesired effects such as a difficulty to cooperate among providers, who turned out to be 
competitors. In order to make up for this, spheres of cooperation such as inter-hospital 
networks have been created, thus resulting in coopetition situations. This concept of 
coopetition, describing the coexistence of cooperative and competitive strategies, was 
developed by Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) and has been observed between 
neighbouring hospitals (Baretta 2008) as well as between hospital networks (Peng & Bourne 
2008). 
 
Some research has been carried out in order to analyse the role of regulatory bodies on 
inter-hospital restructuring. For instance, Mur-Veeman et al. (1999) analysed the ineffective 
role of the Dutch government in implementing integrated care in local contexts. Reay et al. 
(2005) observed the new dominant role of Regional Health Agencies in restructuring 
healthcare in Alberta. The focus of this paper is to contribute to this topic by analysing, in the 
case of inter-hospital reorganization processes in France, the interplay between regulation 
bodies and hospital stakeholders. 
 
Methodology 
 
The empirical analysis is based on two case studies. Two groups of public hospitals, 
relatively advanced in terms of inter-organization reorganization, have been studied in two 
different French regions. 
The first one is a Territory Hospital Community located in southern France, in a 
region unevenly populated on the territory, with remote hospital facing serious medical 
workforce shortages. This community has gathered since 2011 5 hospitals, 2 of which having 
merged since then.  
The second one is a three-hospital group based in the densely populated periphery of a 
major city. These hospitals are managed by the same team and are working on a merger 
project in the short term. 
Studying of both situations makes it possible to draw comparative elements with 
regard to the implementation of inter-hospital reorganization in two different contexts, 
characterized by different levels of integration (from inter-organizational cooperation to 
mergers). Both hospital groups are composed of a core hospital, relatively large and in a 
decent financial situation, and of periphery hospitals, smaller and more prone to economic 
difficulties and medical resources shortages.  
 
The qualitative material collected is mainly based on 30 semi-structured interviews 
with different stakeholders involved in the inter-organizational restructuration processes: 
hospital managers, doctors, as well as members of the Regional Health Agencies. 
In order to complete data collection, the analysis of internal documents dealing with 
this issue, and the observation of a working group about a project of hospital merger, have 
been carried out.  
Data analysis helped the author to identify in the stakeholders’ words the reasons 
mentioned to justify the necessity to perform inter-hospital restructuration, the hardships to 
this movement, as well as the different roles (regulation performed by the RHA as well as 
bottom-up initiatives) and points of view of the actors.  
 
Results 
 
Stakeholders see inter-hospital restructuring as a way of dealing with medical 
workforce shortages in some medical specialties (e.g. anaesthesia and surgery), and also as a 
means of building a stronger visibility and thus competitive position in market areas where 
private clinics are leaders. This is particularly interesting since hospital incomes directly 
depend on their activity and therefore on their market shares. Restructuring in both fields is 
mostly carried out in a soft way by mutualizing teams between the core hospital (relatively 
attractive and autonomous in terms of medical workforce) and periphery hospitals facing 
recruitment and retention concerns. This strategy brings about a better access to public 
healthcare on the territory, as well as the construction of medical networks from primary to 
secondary care between periphery hospitals and the core hospital. It also helps to achieve 
better quality services thanks to teamwork between young physicians and experienced 
professionals.  
 
Thanks to the data collected, it can be inferred that inter-hospital restructuring in both 
situations results from “making do” bottom-up strategies, rather than top-down rational 
regulation, because of the three following factors: 
1. The means of action used by hospital stakeholders coping with uncertain and dynamic 
environment are limited. For instance, investments granted by RHAs are restricted, 
and therefore cooperation or merger processes cannot always be implemented with the 
construction of a new building or with the purchase of a new expensive piece of 
equipment. Similarly, he lack of medical resources problem is only partially, locally 
and temporarily dealt with, thanks to teams mutualisation which sometimes appear to 
be stopgap measures: what is needed according to hospital managers is a national 
policy to regulate the distribution of physicians on the French territory, as well as 
national improvements to the attractiveness of public hospitals (vs. private clinics): 
“There is no clear vision of medical demography in the future in our region” (Hospital 
manager). 
 
2. Some stakeholders are reluctant to promote inter-hospital restructuring because they 
see this as a threat, as a potential loss of power. Hospital leaders in favour of change 
therefore have to make do with these positions that may slow down and reduce the 
scope of integration processes. For instance city mayors still play an important role in 
decision-making processes of this kind (Delas 2011). Medical communities in 
periphery hospitals may see restructuring and cooperative processes as threats to the 
independence of their institution (“We do not want to be absorbed by the core 
hospital”, doctor in a periphery hospital).  Restructuring strategies, when carried out, 
are therefore defensive strategies, they are implemented because no alternative 
solution can be considered, with a certain level of distrust amongst stakeholders.  
 
3. RHAs surprisingly enough do not always play a leading role in inter-hospital 
restructuring, although they do have some tools, such as the ability to impose the 
creation of a Territory Hospital Community. There turns out to be uncertainty about 
the definition of leading stakeholders supposed to run the restructuring project. 
Hospitals therefore also have to make do with this situation when implementing inter-
organizational change: “The RHA does not want to do the first step, to take the lead in 
the process. They are extremely unadventurous and want to let us decide how to sort 
things out” (General Hospital Manager). This conclusion applies to both hospital 
groups analysed, for instance with regard to the perimeter definition of the hospitals to 
be involved in each reorganization process.  
 
Discussion/Conclusion 
 
In this paper we showed that inter-hospital restructuring strategies could be seen by 
stakeholders as positive ways to meet the challenges that French public hospitals are facing. 
However, these processes are often conducted with a bottom-up “making do” approach, with 
uncertainty with regard to the regulation role that RHAs should play and the autonomy that 
hospitals should have.  
 
The implementation of Territory Hospital Groups in the near future in the whole 
country, by the end of 2016, is a milestone showing the government’s willingness to speed up 
restructuring processes thanks to a stronger territory regulation led by the RHAs. It might 
nevertheless prove unsuccessful if some regulation policies on the national scale are not 
implemented, such as policies aiming at softening strong differences in the distribution of 
medical resources on the territory, as was the case in other countries such as Germany.  
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